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Reference-dependent Analysis of Capital Structure and REIT Performance 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using prospect theory, we develop a theoretical framework to examine the 
relationship between leverage and Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) returns by 
introducing the concept of reference point. We postulate that firms’ capital 
structure decisions are affected by target leverage (i.e., the reference point) as 
well as the observed leverage. Market conditions combined with firms’ capital 
structure will put firms in either loss or gain domains, where firms behave 
differently. In general, the leverage-return relationship is positive in the gain 
domain and negative in the loss domain. Firms are then subject to asymmetric 
risk preference in different domains. Our empirical evidence shows strong 
support for the theoretical model. Compared to the conventional approach where 
only observed leverage is used, our model is more flexible and realistic in 
revealing the underlying structure of the leverage–returns relationship.  
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Reference-dependent Analysis of Capital Structure and REIT Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A considerable amount of literature has investigated the relationship between 
leverage and returns (a measurement of firm performance) since Bhabdari (1988). 
Whether a consistent relationship exists between leverage and returns remains 
unclear. The findings from previous literature often vary greatly among sampling 
periods, sectors, or measurements of leverage. For example, using U.S. stock 
market data between 1962 and 1989, Fama & French (1992) find that leverage 
and returns are positively related when market leverage is used, and the 
relationship is reversed when book leverage is adopted. Gomes and Schmid (2010) 
extend the sampling period to 2006, and find the leverage–returns relationship to 
be insignificant when book leverage is used in their analysis. No consensus has 
been reached regarding the reason for the mixed results.  
 
This study considers a behavioral element that has been largely overlooked in the 
capital structure literature. Using prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
we introduce the reference-dependence concept to the stock return model of 
Fama and French (1992) and apply the model in the Real Estate Investment Trust 
(REIT) sector. The challenges facing researchers when applying prospect theory is 
the lack of well-defined reference points and the over-reliance on laboratory 
experiments (see, for example, the discussions in Barberis, 2013). However, in 
financial settings, plausible reference points are easier to be identified (e.g., the 
risk-free rate in investment return analysis) and field data are more readily 
available in good quality and quantity. Consequently, prospect theory has been 
widely adopted to explain puzzles and anomalies in the finance literature, such as 
the low long-term average return on IPO stocks (Barberis & Huang, 2008), equity 
premium puzzle (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) and disposition effect (Barberis & 
Xiong, 2009). Building upon existing literature, we reconcile some puzzling results 
of leverage-return relationship by acknowledging reference-dependence and 
asymmetric risk preferences in firms’ capital structure decisions.   
 
The central idea of our paper is that firms’ capital structure decisions are affected 
by target leverage (i.e., the reference point) as well as the observed leverage. 
Firms adjust their current leverage based on its deviation from the target leverage. 
Considering that target leverage is firm-specific, a given observed leverage can put 
a firm in either the over-leveraged or the under-leveraged position, depending on 
the value of the target leverage. Moreover, the cost of financing varies based on 
market conditions. Over-leveraged firms can enjoy the benefits of leveraging in up 
markets where capital is abundant, whereas they may suffer from the downside of 
leveraging when credits dry out in down markets. The opposite is true for 
under-leveraged firms. Consequently, firms may exhibit asymmetric risk 
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preferences under different combinations of market conditions and leverage 
positions. The relationship between return and leverage should not be simply 
identified as positive, negative, or insignificant unconditionally. The relationship 
should be studied by considering relative leverage positions (over- or 
under-leveraged) and market conditions (up or down market). Based on prospect 
theory, we develop a model to capture this non-linear and asymmetric 
relationship between leverage and return. Compared to the conventional 
approach where only observed leverage is used, our model is more flexible and 
realistic in revealing the underlying structure of the leverage–returns relationship. 
It is also a potential solution to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature.  
 
Our theoretical model is validated with data from the real estate investment trust 
(REIT) sector1. Most of the existing leverage–returns studies exclude the real 
estate sector due to its unique corporate tax requirements. The relationship 
between capital structure and REIT performance remains an under-researched 
area. However, stylized facts indicate that the level of debt-financing affects REITs 
performance significantly (Sun, Titman, & Twite, 2015). We derive the theoretical 
model with the REITs sector specifically in mind in order to bridge this gap in the 
literature. 
 
Specifically, we choose the REIT sector to test our theoretical model for the 
following reasons. First, to meet the special dividend payout requirement, REITs 
have to raise capital more frequently to ensure sufficient cash flow (Devos, Spieler, 
& Tsang, 2014; Hardin & Wu, 2010). Thus, capital structure decisions are 
particularly important to capital-intensive REITs. Second, REITs is one of the few 
industries where the underlying assets are traded in secondary markets (Boudry, 
Kallberg, & Liu, 2010). Hence the REITs sector is more likely to be closely linked to 
local market conditions and underlying assets performance. This makes REITs an 
ideal and unique sector to test our theoretical model. Last, investors have been 
increasingly aware of the benefits of REITs as a vehicle to tap in the fast-growing 
real estate markets around the world. Between 2005 and 2014, the S&P REITs 
index shows a gain of 259% (or an annualized growth rate of 10%) compared to a 
221.39% (or an annualized growth rate of 8.27%) increase in the S&P 500 index. 
In November 2014, S&P Dow Jones Indices and MSCI Inc. decided to create a new 
headline sector for real estate. Equity REITs and listed real estate companies will 
be moved from the Financial Sector to the newly created Real Estate Sector2. With 
all the interesting developments in the REIT sector, research on the relationship 
                                                        
1 Evidences show that REITs behave like stocks in many ways (see, for example, Case, Yang, & 
Yildirim, 2012; Glascock, Lu, & So, 2000). Therefore, our findings not only shed light on capital 
structure decisions in this unique and under-researched sector, but also can be generalized beyond 
the US REIT industry. We tested our models by using US stock market data from 1998 to 2013. The 
results (not presented here for the sake of brevity but available from the authors upon request) 
are consistent with findings from the REIT sector.   
2 https://www.reit.com/investing/reit-basics/reit-industry-timeline#55.  
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between capital structure and REIT performance will benefit all stakeholders 
involved. This statement is particularly true given the fact that existing studies 
primarily focus on REIT capital structure determinants (Alcock, Steiner, & Tan, 
2014; Ertugrul & Giambona, 2010; Harrison, Panasian, & Seiler, 2011) or the 
relationship between REIT capital structure and corporate governance (Alcock, 
Glascock, & Steiner, 2013; Striewe, Rottke, & Zietz, 2013). The relationship 
between capital structure and REIT performance has largely been overlooked.  
 
Empirical evidence provides strong support for our theoretical model. By testing 
the three hypotheses on target leverage formation and leverage–returns 
relationship, we conclude that 1) firm characteristics are useful in the estimation 
of target leverage; 2) reference point (or target leverage) plays an important role 
in the leverage–returns relationship; and 3) firms are subject to asymmetric risk 
preference in loss and gain domains. Specifically, firm-specific and time-varying 
target leverage determines a firm’s leverage position. Such a situation, combined 
with market conditions, will put the firm in either loss or gain domains, where 
firms behave differently. In general, the effect of leverage on returns is positive in 
the gain domain and negative in the loss domain. Moreover, firms are risk averse 
in gain domain but risk seeking in loss domain. As an application of behavioral 
economics in capital structure decisions, this paper considers the role of reference 
point and the heterogeneity of firm behaviors in the loss and gain domains. We 
also verify the robustness of the findings by considering alternative 
measurements of observed leverage. Overall, our model is not sensitive to 
alternative definitions of leverage.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the theoretical model is 
presented and the testable hypotheses are derived in Section 2. The empirical 
implementation of the theoretical framework is discussed in Section 3. 
Discussions on the empirical findings are given in Section 4, followed by 
conclusions provided in Section 5.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
 
This study not only investigates the formation of a reference point in capital 
structure decisions, but also more importantly determines the way a reference 
point operates in the leverage–returns relationship.  
 
The topic of capital structure decisions can be traced back to Modigliani and 
Miller’s first proposition (Modigliani & Millier, 1958). They proposed that firm 
value should be irrelevant to its capital structure decisions in the absence of taxes, 
information asymmetry, transaction costs, and bankruptcy costs, among others. 
The assumptions above are strong with respect to the imperfect market 
conditions in reality. Subsequent research has tested this proposition vigorously 
 5 
by answering two fundamental questions. First, is a capital structure decision 
relevant to firm performance? If yes, then second, what effect should leverage 
have on firm performance?  
 
Conventionally, researchers use observed leverage as a factor in investigating the 
leverage–returns relationship (Bhabdari, 1988; Fama & French, 1992; George & 
Hwang, 2010; Gomes & Schmid, 2010). Specifically,  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖,𝑡|𝑪𝑖,𝑡)                                                  (1), 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the shareholders return of firm i at time t+1, 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the observed 
leverage of firm i at time t, and 𝑪𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables. 
 
Bhabdari (1988) is the first to empirically test the relationship between leverage 
and return using the above-stated model. Until now, most of the available 
empirical evidence is inconsistent with the irrelevance proposition. The violation 
of its friction-free market environment assumption determines that firm 
performance depends on the way firms finance their operations. However, the 
exact relationship between leverage and returns is less clear (Gomes & Schmid, 
2010). Findings often vary greatly among sampling periods, sectors, or 
measurements of leverage (Bhabdari, 1988; Fama & French, 1992; George & 
Hwang, 2010; Gomes & Schmid, 2010; Livdan et al., 2009; Penman, Richardson, & 
Tuna, 2007; Trigeorgis & Lambertides, 2014).  To solve this puzzle, some 
researchers consider firms’ leverage targeting behaviors in the basic model by 
Bhabdari (1988). It has been established in the capital structural literature that 
firms gradually adjust their capital structure towards an optimal leverage (e.g., 
Chang & Dasgupta, 2009; Flannery & Rangan, 2006). Consequently, capital 
structure decisions should be based on the deviation of a firm’s leverage from its 
target leverage. A recent study by Caskey et al. (2012) introduce this concept into 
the leverage-return relationship studies by considering ‘excess leverage’, which is 
essentially the deviation of observed leverage from the target leverage. This 
dynamic view of capital structure offers plausible explanation to the puzzling 
findings in the literature.    
 
We extend the work of Caskey et al. (2012) by formulating a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of leverage deviation based on prospect theory. Caskey 
et al. (2012) consider linear relationship between excess leverage and returns 
only. We relax this assumption by deriving a flexible theoretical model from 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We make use of the value function 
in prospect theory to capture the non-linear and asymmetric relationship 
between leverage and returns. The proposed theoretical model recognizes the 
important role of target leverage in capital structure decisions. More importantly, 
it provides a flexible framework to derive testable hypotheses in empirical 
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studies.  
 
Prospect theory improves the explanatory power of conventional economic 
theories, especially when considering consumer preference and status quo 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory introduces a reference point to the 
decision making process. Under prospect theory, individuals do not value their 
gains and losses based on global or globally available wealth but rather take stock 
of these values relative to an individually specific reference point. Without losing 
any generality, the relationship can be described with Equation (2) and illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
 
𝑣(𝑋) = {
(𝑋 − 𝑟)𝑎                    𝑋 ≥ 𝑟
−𝜆(𝑟 − 𝑋)𝑐                 𝑋 < 𝑟
              (2), 
 
where v(X) is the value function based on outcome X, and r is the reference point. 
When X is greater than r, individuals enter the gain domain; otherwise, they fall in 
the loss domain. 𝜆 is the loss aversion coefficient. 𝜆 > 1 reflects that individuals’ 
value function in the loss domain is steeper than that in the gain domain (i.e., loss 
aversion). a and c are diminishing sensitivity coefficient in the gain and loss 
domains, respectively. a < 1 and c < 1 indicate that the marginal gains and losses 
diminish with the distance between X and r. Individuals are risk averse in the gain 
domain but risk seeking in the loss domain. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
Under prospect theory, firms should not evaluate shareholders’ returns based on 
globally observed leverage but should instead re-assess their capital structure 
relative to firm-specific reference points (i.e., firms’ target leverage). The 
introduction of reference point offers two advantages. First, it facilitates the 
determination of firms’ relative positions (over- or under-leveraged) of observed 
leverage to their target. The magnitude of the leverage deviation can be quantified 
subsequently. Second, the reference point can be combined with market 
conditions to determine whether a firm is in a loss or gain domain. We believe that 
firms make different adjustment decisions on capital structure in the loss and gain 
domains. Considering that the cost of capital is determined by market liquidity 
(Subrahmanyam, 2007), an up market is reasonably assumed to place 
under-leveraged firms in the loss domain. The cost of financing is relatively low 
under such a market condition. Thus, under-leveraged firms may forgo 
investment opportunities when they are less funded. Similarly, a down market 
places over-leveraged firms in the loss domain. With the relatively high cost of 
capital in down market, over-leveraged firms are bonded with collateral 
constraints (Livdan et al., 2009), which may cause them to suffer financial distress 
and bankruptcy risks. In summary, adjustment cost varies according to market 
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condition, which ultimately determines that firms will not behave identically in 
these two domains. The complex relationship between leverage and returns is 
further illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
Accordingly, Equation (1) can be re-written as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑓 (|𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡|| 𝑪𝑖,𝑡)                                           (3), 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the reference point of firm i at time t, which is also the target 
leverage; and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑪𝑖,𝑡 remain as previously defined. 
 
The introduction of a reference point 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 in Equation (3) establishes the role of 
the target leverage in capital structure decisions. A firm’s capital structure 
position is determined by two factors: leverage deviation from the target leverage 
(i.e., |𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡|), and market conditions. The marginal effect of leverage deviation 
is given in the table below.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
We allow 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 to vary among firms and over time. Although firms tend to have a 
stable leverage in the long run (e.g., two decades or longer), the unobserved firm 
specific factors can explain about 60% of the variation in leverage only (Lemmon, 
Roberts, & Zender, 2008). Other time-varying and cross-section varying factors, 
such as profitability and growth potential, significantly affect capital structure 
decisions, albeit to a lesser extent. More recent studies such as DeAngello & Roll 
(2015) question the stability of cross-sectional leverage. Also, as emphasized by 
Korteweg (2010), firms adjust their leverage dynamically. In the short term, the 
optimal leverage (i.e., 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) does not necessarily equal the long-term target ratio 
because adjustment cost is not constant over time and across firms. 
 
Existing empirical studies have confirmed the presence of firms’ targeting 
behavior regarding capital structure decisions. Examples can be found in the work 
of Chang and Dasgupta (2009), Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) and Graham 
and Harvey (2001). In addition, Flannery and Rangan (2006) propose that 
leverage target should depend on a series of a firm’s characteristics related to the 
costs of financial distress and the benefits from tax shields. Moreover, Korteweg 
(2010) summarizes the variation of leverage targets with firm characteristics, 
especially firm size and profitability. Furthermore, in a financial context, Baucells 
et al. (2011) investigate the formation of reference points by decision makers by 
weighting sequences of market information. Building upon theoretical and 
empirical findings in the literature, we propose that the firm-level target leverage 
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𝑟𝑖,𝑡 can be measured as a combination of firm-level characteristics 𝛾0＋ 𝜸𝜶𝑖,𝑡−1, 
where 𝜶𝑖,𝑡−1 is a group of characteristics for firm i at time t-1, 𝜸 is the weighting 
vector, and 𝛾0 is the constant term that captures the long-term, time-invariant 
component of leverage. 
 
We use the partial adjustment model proposed by Flannery and Rangan (2006) to 
obtain reliable estimates of 𝛾0, 𝜸  and ultimately the estimated value of 𝑟𝑖,𝑡. 
Although firms are trying to maintain their leverage at the target level, adjustment 
costs may prevent them from doing so. The partial adjustment model allows us to 
estimate how firm’s capital structure partially adjusts toward its target within 
each time period. Each year, the typical firm takes positive steps to close the gap 
between its actual leverage and its expectation with a certain adjustment speed, 
as described below:  
 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛽(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (4), 
 
where 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1  are the observed leverage of firm i at time t and t-1, 
respectively, and 𝛽 is the speed of adjustment showing the speed at which firms 
converge toward their expectations. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
 
In substituting the measurement of 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 into equation (4) we can obtain: 
 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝛾0 + (𝛽𝜸)𝜶𝑖,𝑡−1  + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (5) 
 
In essence, leverage is determined by a weighted average of the target leverage 
and observed leverage, with the weights determined by the adjustment rate 
towards the target leverage. 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 can then be calculated by using the estimates of 
𝜸 and 𝛾0 in Equation (5).   
 
Once the value of the target leverage level is determined, Equation (3) can verify 
the relationship between leverage and returns with a reference point. Specifically, 
Equation (3) can be the basis for deriving the following hypotheses:  
 
Testable hypothesis 1: Firm-level characteristics determine the formation of 
target leverage. 
 
If this hypothesis is true, then the estimation coefficients of 𝛽 and 𝜸 in Equation 
(5) are significantly different from zero. As a result, firm-level characteristics do 
affect reference point, or target leverage.  
 
Testable hypothesis 2: A reference point matters in the relationship between 
leverage and returns.  
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In order to test this hypothesis, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  will be used to estimate 
𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕|𝐿𝑖,𝑡−𝑟𝑖,𝑡|
 under 
various combinations of market condition and leverage position. Results can be 
used to verify the relationship described in Table 1.  
 
Once a reference point is determined, firms are then placed into either gain 
domain (i.e., the marginal effect of leverage deviation, |𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡|, is positive) or 
loss domain (i.e., the marginal effect of leverage deviation, |𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡|, is negative). 
We expect that firms’ capital structure decisions are not uniform in the two 
domains, as illustrated in Figure 2. A final hypothesis is derived as follows.  
 
Testable hypothesis 3: Firms are risk averse in gain domain but risk seeking in 
loss domain when making capital structure decisions. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, an appropriate functional form will be adopted to 
verify the relationship between leverage deviation and return in Figure 2. As 
illustrated in Section 3, we include leverage deviation and its quadratic term in 
Equation (3). If the coefficient estimate is positive for leverage deviation and 
negative for its quadratic term in gain domain, we can conclude that firms are risk 
averse in gain domain when adjusting to target leverage. On the other hand, if 
firms are risk seeking when making capital structure decisions, we expect that the 
coefficient estimate is negative for leverage deviation and positive for its quadratic 
term. This relationship should hold true for both up and down market.  
 
3. Empirical Implementation 
 
We use REITs in North America as an example to test the proposed theoretical 
framework. The data are collected from WRDS and SNL database3 (SIC code: 
6798). They cover North American equity REITs from 1993 to 2013. After 
removing missing values, outliers, and firms with less than two years’ financial 
statement, 2,342 firm-year observations are retained. We first form estimations of 
target leverage for each firm in all periods, which are subsequently used to verify 
the role of leverage deviations on REIT performance.  
 
3.1 Target leverage estimation 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (5) is the observed leverage ratio of firm i at 
time t. It is defined as the ratio of book value of total debt (i.e., debt in current 
liabilities plus long-term debt) to market value of assets (i.e., total debt plus 
                                                        
3 Monthly stock returns are from the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Financial 
statement data are collected from the Compustat Industrial Annual database. REITs characteristics variables 
are obtained from SNL.  
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closing stock price of each fiscal year times number of outstanding common 
shares).  
 
The independent variables include one-period lagged observed leverage and a set 
of firm-level characteristics. Firm-level characteristics are subsequently divided 
into two groups: traditional capital structure determinants and REIT attributes. 
We include firm size, profitability, growth potential, and asset tangibility as 
traditional capital structure determinants. As pointed out by Cashman et al. 
(2013), these four factors are the most robust predictors of leverage. The 
consensus in the literature is that leverage is positively related to firm size and 
asset tangibility but negatively related to profitability and growth potential. 
Details of variable definitions, formulas, data sources, and references can be found 
in Table 2.  
 
The choice of REIT attributes is largely based on the work of Cashman et al. (2013) 
and Harrison et al. (2011). Specifically, four aspects of REITs attributes are 
considered as follows:  
 
Liability Structure: The financing choice of REITs is influenced by their existing 
liability structure (Brown & Riddiough, 2003). We consider the role of secured 
debt and rated debt in our models. SECURED is defined as the ratio of secured 
debt to total debt. Companies with a higher proportion of secured debt tend to 
finance by issuing equity. Otherwise, additional public debt is preferred (Brown & 
Riddiough, 2003). Hence, the coefficient estimation of SECURED is expected to be 
negative. RATED is a dummy variable that equals one if a REIT has an S&P 
long-term issuer credit rating. Companies with a credit rating are associated with 
either low transaction cost or high transparency. Mixed findings are found 
regarding its effect on financing decisions (Boudry et al., 2010; Cashman et al., 
2013; Harrison et al., 2011).  
 
Firm Age: Firm age is defined as number of years since the initial public offering 
of a REIT. It is associated with the level of information asymmetry. Older firms are 
likely to upgrade their use of public debt because the market knows more about 
them over time. Hence, the expected sign for AGE is positive, although insignificant 
estimates are not uncommon in the literature (see for example Harrison et al., 
2011).  
 
Operating Strategy: Operating strategy is captured by activities such as 
repurchase and dividend payout. REP is a continuous variable that represents the 
amount of share repurchases in each fiscal year (Boudry, Kallberg, & Liu, 2013)4. 
Repurchasing common shares will reduce the equity level of a REIT, which is 
                                                        
4 When Common Share Repurchases information is missing, we set the corresponding REP value 
to be zero. 
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considered as a positive signal in the marketplace5. Additionally, EXCESS_DIV 
reflects companies’ dividend policies. It is defined as the amount of common stock 
dividend payout minus 90% of pretax income, divided by total assets. Pecking 
order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) predicts that EXCESS_DIV would have a 
positive loading.  
 
Market timing behavior: PRICE_NAV captures any market timing behaviors. 
According to market timing theory, REITs with a high price to Net Asset Value 
(NAV) are more likely to raise capital through equity (Boudry et al., 2010; 
Harrison et al., 2011; Ooi, Ong, & Li, 2010).  
 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
3.2 Leverage deviation and the leverage–returns relations  
 
To verify the role of target leverage in Equation (3), we extend the model of Fama 
& French (1992) and Fama & French (2008) as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Σ𝑘=1
𝑙 𝝉𝑘𝑪𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗                            (6), 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑗  is the monthly stock return, and 𝑪𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables 
including measurements of market capitalization, book to market ratio of equity, 
momentum, and underlying asset performance. The monthly returns between July 
(i.e., j = 7) in calendar year t+1 to June (i.e., j = 6) in calendar year t+2 are matched 
with annual financial data ending in calendar year t.   The definition and 
calculation of control variables are both described in details below and 
summarized in Table 3.  
 
Market capitalization is calculated as the natural logarithm of the market value of 
the outstanding common shares of firms. Book to market ratio of equity is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity and the 
market value of equity. Momentum return is calculated on a monthly basis. For 
each of the 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 , the corresponding monthly momentum is an 11-month 
compounded return from month j-12 to month j-2. We include this factor to 
control for the momentum anomaly (i.e., a positive relationship between past 
returns over the last year and future returns over the next few months). Similar to 
Fama & French (2008), we omit month j-1 when calculating momentum return to 
avoid the influence of a negative correlation between the return of month j and j-1 
(Jegadeesh, 1990). NOI_NPI captures underlying asset performance. It is 
                                                        
5  Existing studies use both continuous variable of share repurchases (i.e., the amount of 
repurchases) and dummy variables to measure REITs share repurchases (see, for example, Boudry 
et al., 2013; Harrison et al., 2011). In this study, our results are quantitatively identical when using 
continuous variables and dummy variable of share repurchases.  
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calculated as the ratio of net operating income to net property investment. This 
control variable is designed to capture any REITs specific characteristics because 
REITs is one of the few industries where underlying assets are traded in 
secondary markets (Boudry et al., 2010). Therefore, the performance of REITs 
underlying assets has a potential influence on its stock performance. If one unit of 
REITs property investment generates higher operating income, it will be 
considered as a positive signal to investors and consequently have a positive 
loading on REITs return. This approach is also adopted in Harrison et al (2011)’s 
empirical work.  
 
We first extend Equation (6) by replacing observed leverage 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 with Deviation, a 
measurement of leverage deviation from the target leverage. Deviation is 
calculated as |𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡|. 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + Σ𝑘=1
𝑙 𝝉𝑘𝑪𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗                         (7) 
 
Equation (7) provides a crude test for reference point dependence in capital 
structure decision analysis. 𝜃1 caputures the effect of leverage deviation on 
returns. However, this model specification overlooks the dynamic nature of 
asymmetric risk preferences as described in our conceptual framework. Leverage 
deviation has different effects on returns according to their leverage position 
(under- or over-leveraged) and market condition (up or down market), as shown 
in Table 1. Subsequently, Equation (7) is revised to obtain Equation (8) as follows:  
 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜃2𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2 + 𝜃3𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝜔  
     +𝜃4𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2 ∗ 𝜔 + 𝜃5𝜔 + Σ𝑘=1
𝑙 𝝉𝑘𝑪𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗                    (8), 
 
where 𝜔  equals one for up markets or zero otherwise. The inclusion of 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2 allows the test of risk preferences. The interaction terms between 
Deviation, 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2, and 𝜔 capture the moderating effect of market condition 
on the leverage–returns relationship. Equation (8) is estimated using 
over-leveraged (when 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) and under-leveraged (when 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) 
subsamples separately. 𝜃1 , 𝜃2 , 𝜃3 , and 𝜃4 combined provide estimates of 
marginal effect of leverage deviation in Table 1. If Hypothesis 2 is true, the 
expected sign for 𝜃1 is negative in a down market, and the expected effect of 
𝜃1 + 𝜃3 is positive in an up market for over-leveraged firms. If hypothesis 3 is true, 
the expected sign of 𝜃2 is positive for over-leveraged firms in a down market, and 
the value of 𝜃2 + 𝜃4 is expected to be negative in an up market. The opposite is 
true for under-leveraged firms. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
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4. Findings and Discussions 
4.1 Target leverage estimation 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the observed leverage and firm-level 
characteristics. Despite differences in sampling period and sample size, our 
sample shows similar statistical characteristics with those of other samples used 
in existing REIT capital structure literature. More specifically, the mean observed 
leverage of REITs over the study period is 0.461, which indicates that on average 
the total debt counts for more than 45% of the total assets of REITs6. Around 40% 
of the REITs in our sample have outstanding rated debt, and two-thirds of the 
total debt are secured debt. The characteristics of other control variables, such as 
market-to-book ratio and total assets, are largely in line with the literature.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
As many of the capital structure determinants (i.e., 𝜶𝑖,𝑡−1 in Equation 5) listed in 
Table 2 are highly correlated, we follow the common practice (Lettau & Ludvigson, 
2001, 2004; Lizieri, 2013; Paiella, 2009) to orthogonalize these variables before 
estimating Equation (5). We consider three model specifications: an Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) model as the benchmark, a Least Square Dummy Variable (or 
fixed effect model, henceforth FE) model, and a system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) model 7 . The best estimates from these three model 
specifications are subsequently used to calculate the firm-level target leverage 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 . 
The coefficient estimates from these three models are given in Table 5.  
The OLS model (Model 1 in Table 5) includes year dummy variables but does not 
consider firm fixed effect. Although the model has a good adjusted R square and 
as-expected coefficient estimates, it does not provide an accurate estimation of 
adjustment speed (i.e., 𝛽 in our model), which is an essential input in our next 
step of analysis. More specifically, the OLS model suffers from measurement 
errors and endogeneity because of simultaneity between the dependent variable 
and leverage ratio. The system GMM method (Blundell & Bond, 1998) is employed 
to address these issues. Following the empirical implementation in Blundell and 
Bond (1998), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. (2008), and Flannery & 
Hankins (2013), we then incorporate firm fixed effect by using a conventional FE 
method (Model 2) and a system GMM method (Model 3). Our findings are 
                                                        
6 In comparison, REITs debt levels are higher than the general firms. In our sampling period, the 
mean leverage level for the general firms (excluding financial companies) is approximately 31%.  
7 Unlike standard parametric methods such as OLS, GMM does not make assumptions about the 
distributional properties of variables. The GMM estimators are known as the most consistent and 
efficient one in all moment-based estimators. More technical details about this method can be 
found in Hansen (1982).     
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consistent with econometric theory predictions and other existing empirical 
findings by showing that the speed of adjustment from the GMM model lies 
between the estimates obtained by the OLS and FE models (See Table 5).  
Although the use of FE or GMM method does not affect the estimation of the target 
leverage, the coefficient estimates of adjustment speed (i.e., 𝛽 in Equation 5) 
change notably in Model 2 and Model 3. The estimated adjustment speed 𝛽 tends 
to be biased downward by the OLS method but biased upward in FE models, 
whereas system GMM offers more precise estimates (see for example Blundell & 
Bond, 1998; Flannery & Hankins, 2013). In Table 5, the estimation of 𝛽 from 
Model 3 is located between the estimations obtained from Model 1 and Model 2. 
The result is in line with existing studies. Consequently, the calculation of the 
reference point and the discussions below are based on the coefficient 
estimations from Model 3. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Model 3, the determinants of target leverage include traditional capital 
structure determinants, such as profitability and growth, as well as the specific 
attributes of REITs such as rated debt, firm age, excess dividend and price to NAV. 
All significant variables in Model 3 are directionally consistent with ex ante 
expectations. Based on Model 3, the target leverage estimates, and subsequently 
the three leverage deviation measurements (i.e., Deviation, Over-leverage, and 
Under-leverage) to be used in the next step of our analysis, are obtained.  
4.2 Leverage deviation and the leverage–returns relations 
 
As Korteweg (2010) suggests, imperfect market environment drives firms away 
from their target leverage levels. This point is confirmed in our data. In Figure 3, 
the annual average deviation from the target leverage ranges from -32% to 25% 
in our sampling period. The deviation from the target leverage is obviously not 
time-invariant. The non-frictionless market can also generate cross-sectional 
heterogeneity, which means that the deviation is not cross-sectionally invariant. 
This fact can be reflected by the standard deviation of Deviation calculated in each 
year (i.e., the solid bars in Figure 3 using the right axis). The values are generally 
above 10% for most of the years in our sampling period, suggesting that the 
deviation from the target leverage varied significantly among firms within each 
year. The two pieces of evidence combined make a strong case for the time- and 
firm-varying nature of leverage deviation. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 
We then explore the correlation among the variables included in Equations (6), 
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(7), and (8) as shown in Table 6. The correlation between Deviation and observed 
leverage is low (i.e., 0.016), which is not surprising because Deviation does not 
reflect the direction of the deviation from the target leverage (i.e. over- or 
under-leveraged). The absolute values of correlation coefficients between 
observed leverage and the new leverage measurements (i.e., over-leverage and 
under-leverage) are above 0.30. Meanwhile, the correlations between the three 
leverage deviation measurements and the control variables (i.e., market 
capitalization, book to market ratio of equity, momentum, and NOI_NPI) are small. 
Hence, multi-collinearity will not be a concern.  
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, Equation (6) to Equation (8) are estimated by using 
observed leverage (𝐿𝑖,𝑡), deviations from the target leverage (Deviation), and 
leverage position (Over-leverage and Under-leverage), respectively, combined 
with market conditions. The result is 14 models in three groups, as shown in 
Table 7 (equation 6 and 7) and Table 8 (equation 8), respectively. All models are 
estimated using the GMM method.  
Model (1) to Model (5) in Table 7 are used as the base models in the analysis of 
the leverage–returns relationship. The coefficient of market leverage is significant 
and positive, which is in line with the existing literature (Bhabdari, 1988; Fama & 
French, 1992; Gomes & Schmid, 2010; Trigeorgis & Lambertides, 2014). However, 
the explanatory power of market leverage is reduced significantly when we 
successively control for market capitalization (Model 2), book to market ratio of 
equity (Model 3), momentum (Model 4), and NOI_NPI (Model 5). The effect of 
observed leverage has been absolved by market capitalization and/or book to 
market ratio of equity. Similar evidence regarding the limitations of using 
observed market leverage has been documented by Gomes and Schmid (2010).  
With these considerations in mind, we estimate Equation (7) by replacing 
observed leverage with Deviation, which is a measurement of leverage deviation 
from the target leverage. This step is a crude check of the presence of reference 
points in capital structure decisions. The results are labeled Model (6) to Model 
(10) in Table 7. Contrary to the findings in Model (1) to (5), the effect of Deviation 
is not reduced significantly by the inclusion of market capitalization, book to 
market ratio of equity, momentum, and NOI_NPI. The significant and positive 
loading of Deviation confirms the role of target leverage (i.e., a reference point) in 
the leverage–returns relationship, and it suggests that Deviation is less sensitive 
to the inclusion of control variables. This result is an improvement of the base 
models.  
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
However, the specifications of Model (6) to Model (10) overlook the dynamic 
adjustment process, as described in our conceptual framework. This issue is 
reflected by the unexpected positive sign of Deviation in all four models. In theory, 
any deviation from the target leverage should be undesirable, and consequently 
the coefficient of Deviation should be negative. However, leverage deviation may 
have different effects on returns based on their leverage position (under- or 
over-leveraged) and market condition (up or down market). As captured by 
Hypothesis 2 and 3, the combined effect of both reference dependence and risk 
preference moderates the relationship between leverage and returns. Failure to 
control for these effects may result in biased coefficient estimates. To address this 
issue, Model (10) in Table 7 is re-estimated by splitting the whole sample into the 
over-leveraged and under-leveraged sub-samples and by adding quadratic terms 
of Deviation to capture any non-linear relationship between leverage deviation 
and returns. As reported in Model (1) and Model (3) in Table 8, considering 
leverage position alone is not sufficient, as coefficient estimates of Deviation and 
Deviation2 are counter-intuitive in both models. The two models are further 
extended by including interaction terms of a market condition dummy variable, 
and the resultant models are labeled Model (2) and Model (4) in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Model (2) and (4) in Table 8 are the empirical realizations of Equation (8). The 
coefficient estimates of 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, and 𝜃4 are used to calculate the marginal 
effect of leverage deviation. As shown in Table 9, the estimations are consistent 
with our expectation in Table 1. A reference point matters in the relationship 
between leverage and returns. Once a reference point is determined, firms are 
then placed into either gain or loss domain. As described in our theoretical model, 
over-leveraged firms find themselves in the gain domain in an up market 
(i.e., ?̂?1 + 𝜃3 > 0), and in the loss domain during market downturns (i.e., 𝜃1 < 0). 
The opposite effect (i.e., 𝜃1 + 𝜃3 < 0) in up markets and (𝜃1 > 0) in down 
markets, can be found for under-leveraged firms.  
The estimated value of 𝜃2 and 𝜃4 can be used to identify firms’ risk preference at 
different market conditions. Our results suggest that firms are risk averse in gain 
domain but risk seeking in loss domain. Specifically, under-leveraged firms are 
risk-averse in down markets (i.e., 𝜃2< 0) and risk-seeking in up markets (i.e., 
𝜃2 + 𝜃4 > 0). For example, with higher financing cost in down markets, firms that 
choose lower level of debt overhang is risk-averse because they are trying to 
minimize financial distress or bankruptcy risk. An asymmetric risk preference (i.e., 
𝜃2>0) in down markets and (𝜃2 + 𝜃4 < 0) in up markets, can be found for 
over-leverage firms as well. The findings are also consistent with the prediction 
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based on the notion of diminishing sensitivity, which is the foundation of 
risk-seeking and risk-averse preferences in loss and gain domains respectively.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
We find evidence to support the three testable hypotheses based on the proposed 
theoretical model. Target leverage, which is determined by firm-level 
characteristics, plays an important role as reference point in the leverage–returns 
relationship. Subsequently, firms are placed into either gain domain or loss 
domain under various combinations of leverage positions and market conditions. 
The deviation of observed leverage from its target leverage level affects firm 
returns significantly. When adjusting to target leverage, firms are found to be risk 
averse in gain domain but risk seeking in loss domain.  
We investigate the robustness of these empirical findings by adopting different 
measurements of observed leverage (i.e., 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 in Equation 5). We have considered 
book leverage and long-term leverage as alternative definitions of observed 
leverage. Regression output and discussions can be found in Tables A1 and A2 in 
the Appendix. In summary, the use of firm characteristics for target leverage 
estimation is an important step in our theoretical model. The firm-level 
characteristics included in our theoretical model provide a significant and robust 
estimation of target leverage across all three leverage measurements (see Table 
A1); the estimation of Equation (5) is not sensitive to the definition of leverage, as 
shown in Table A2. Although empirical results vary across differently observed 
leverage measurements, they all support our theoretical model8. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study proposes a reference-dependent model to examine the relationship 
between a firm’s decisions on capital structure and its performance. The 
conventional approach only considers observed leverage and overly simplifies the 
relationship between leverage and returns. Specifically, leverage is related to 
returns unconditional of firms’ relative leverage position and market conditions. 
This assumed relationship inevitably gives rise to inconclusive findings as 
prevalent in the literature. In reality, the identified leverage–returns relationship 
varies greatly among sampling periods, sectors, or measurements of leverage. 
                                                        
8 We also checked if our results are sensitive to structural break around the last financial crisis. . The average 
estimated target leverage is significantly different from the corresponding industrial median in our sampling 
period (two-sample t-test statistics are all significant at the 5% level). This pattern is consistent before and 
after the financial crisis. We did not estimate the models in Tables 6 - 8 by splitting the sample into before- 
and after-crisis subsamples, because the after-crisis subsample is not large enough for GMM estimation.  
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By treating the firm-specific target leverage as a reference point, our model 
improves upon conventional models in two ways. First, with a reference point 
clearly defined, the relative position of the observed leverage to its target can be 
determined. Subsequently firms are classified as either over- or under-leveraged. 
Second, and more importantly, firms can be placed in either a loss or gain domain, 
which depends not only on the above-mentioned relative position (i.e., over- or 
under-leveraged) but also on the market condition (i.e., boom or bust). Under the 
assumption that leverage is positively related to returns in the gain domain and 
negatively related to returns in the loss domain, one can analyze and predict firms’ 
returns accordingly. More importantly, firms are subject to asymmetric risk 
preferences under different domains. Our framework clearly shows that observed 
leverage alone is not sufficient to support the analysis of the leverage–returns 
relationship because it is incapable of determining the domain that a firm is 
located. A complete analysis of this relationship would require a combination of 
the observed leverage and target leverage. The independent variables used in the 
target leverage estimation are not restricted to the ones included in this paper. 
Future studies may consider other firm-specific characteristics such as manager’s 
compensation structure and bank lines of credit (Hardin & Hill, 2011; Sufi, 2009, 
Brown & Riddiough, 2003).  
Our study contributes to the academic community as the proposed theoretical 
model can help researchers to better understand and reconcile inconsistent 
findings in the literature. A reference point lies in the heart of our theoretical 
model. Relative leverage position and market conditions are the two integral 
elements in the theoretical framework. Omitting either of the two will potentially 
bias the estimates. For example, a positive relationship between market leverage 
and U.S. stock returns is documented by Bhabdari (1988) whereas a negative 
relationship is report by Penman et al. (2007). One of many possible reasons 
behind these conflicting findings is that Bhabdari (1988) uses data from 1948 to 
1979, when the U.S. stock market primarily experienced rapid growth. As a result, 
a positive relationship between leverage and returns is found. However, the 
sampling period of Penman et al. (2007) (that is, 1962-2001) covers more market 
downturns, which may cause the relationship to be negative. Similar puzzling 
findings can be found in the work of George and Hwang (2010) and Penman et al. 
(2007) even if their sampling periods are the same. George and Hwang (2010) 
show a negative relationship between book leverage and returns for 
high-leverage subsamples, whereas the opposite is true for low-leverage 
subsample. However, similar results can not be found in Penman et al. (2007). 
Such conflicting findings are partly due to the fact that George and Hwang (2010) 
considers leverage position (i.e., highly leveraged or not) whereas Penman et al. 
(2007) does not. The explanatory power of our theoretical model is also verified 
by empirical evidence from the U.S. REITs market.  
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Our findings also have practical implications to investors and policymakers. One 
interesting observation from Table 9 is that over-leveraged firms behave 
differently between up and down markets. Specifically, the curve for 
over-leveraged firms in the loss domain (or down market) is much steeper to 
start with, and flats out much quicker than the one in the gain domain (or up 
market). The shapes of curves for under-leveraged firms, however, are almost 
identical in the loss and gain domains (or up and down market). This predicts 
substantial risk-seeking behaviours among over-leveraged firms during market 
downturns, which results in a slow adjustment towards their target leverage. 
According to the causal relationship that we established in Equation (7), this will 
eventually hurt the firms’ performance. This is consistent with the empirical 
findings in Sun, Titman, & Twite (2015).  
Two conclusions can be drawn from this observation. Firstly, over-leveraged 
REITs are particularly risky during market downturns. Investors should adjust 
their portfolio according to the dynamic leverage-return relationship identified in 
our analysis by simultaneously taking into account market condition and firm’s 
leverage position. Secondly, policymakers should be aware of the role of debt 
ratio in REITs performance during crisis. Given that REITs are required to pay 90% 
of their taxable income as dividend, they are more likely to be deprived of cash 
during market downturns and rely heavily on debts to raise fund, which may 
exacerbate their financial distress. Government may consider some temporary 
dividend-breaks during such period, similar to the higher stamp duty starting 
threshold implemented by the UK government from 3 September 2008 to 31 
December 2009. This may nudge over-leveraged REITs to reduce debt ratio and 
move out of the loss domain.  
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Appendix 
Book leverage is calculated as the book value of total debt to the book value of 
assets; long-term leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to the 
market value of assets. These alternative definitions give similar results in the 
estimation for target leverage in terms of the number of significant variables and 
the signs of coefficient estimates. The results of GMM model using the three 
leverage definitions are given in Table A1.  
 
[Insert Table A1 Here] 
We then re-estimate Equations (6), (7), and (8) with the target leverage estimated 
from the two alternative definitions of observed leverage. The results are given in 
Table A2. Compared with market leverage, the book leverage model provides 
weaker support to our hypotheses in analysis of the leverage–returns relationship. 
This result echoes to certain extent the inconclusive findings in the literature, 
where book leverage is found to be less related to firm performance (see, for 
example, Gomes and Schmid, 2010). Results of the long-term leverage models are 
consistent with those of our market leverage models. Although the number of 
significant coefficients is reduced in the long-term leverage model, all significant 
coefficient estimates are directionally consistent with the predictions based on 
our theoretical model. This result indicates that our findings are robust across 
different definitions of observed leverage.  
 
 [Insert Table A2 Here] 
 
